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1. Introduction 
 
One of the first lessons that beginning students of economics learn about the principles of 
public finance is that indirect or commodity taxes are harmful to the efficiency of the 
economy. The partial equilibrium analysis that forms the basis for this conclusion is a simple 
and compelling one: A commodity tax drives a wedge between the marginal cost of 
production (as represented by the supply curve) and the marginal consumer benefit (as 
represented by the demand curve). The tax therefore prevents the market mechanism from 
reaching the efficient equilibrium solution where marginal cost is equal to marginal benefit. 
 
In a later lesson the student may learn that there are exceptions to this rule. If there are 
negative externalities associated with the production or consumption of a particular 
commodity - the typical example being adverse effects on the quality of the environment - 
efficiency may in fact be improved by taxation. Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that 
the externality in question generates a positive difference between social and private marginal 
cost, while private and social marginal benefits coincide. The requirement for efficiency is 
that the social marginal cost of production should be equal to the social marginal benefit, 
which again is equal to the private marginal benefit: 
 
SMC = SMB = PMB. 
 
Suppose further that this market operates according to the principles of perfect competition 
except that the market prices with which producers and consumers are faced are allowed to 
differ. Producers, who are assumed to maximize profits, set their private marginal cost equal 
to the producer price (p), while consumers, who maximize utility, equate their marginal 
benefit to the consumer price (P): 
 
PMC = p, PMB = P. 
 
Now, if the tax rate is defined by the equation P = p + t, we can substitute in the first equation 
to obtain the socially optimal deviation between the consumer and producer prices, 
 
SMC - PMC = P - p, 
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or the socially optimal tax rate  
 
t = SMC - PMC. 
 
A tax rate that is equal to the difference between social and private marginal costs perfectly 
internalizes the externality and restores efficiency to a market that would otherwise 
have found itself at an inefficient equilibrium. Thus, the case for an environmental or green or 
Pigouvian tax basically rests on its incentive effects; it ensures that decisions about production 
and consumption that are rational from a private point of view are consistent with efficiency 
for society as a whole. In addition, since t is the same for all polluters, the taxation scheme 
ensures that the marginal cost of pollution cutbacks is the same for all polluters, implying that 
the aggregate social cost of pollution reduction is minimized. 
 
A further benefit of environmental taxes is that they generate revenue for the government, and 
they do so without creating inefficiencies in an otherwise efficient market system. 
Substituting environmental taxes for ordinary commodity and income taxes should 
accordingly be able to raise the same amount of revenue as before but with less social cost. 
This “double dividend” of environmental taxes could be expected to make them extremely 
popular taxes; in fact, one would expect them to be the first building block of an efficient tax 
system. But this is rather far from being the case in real life. There could be several reasons 
for this, and some of them will be explored in a little more detail in the following.  
 
2. History of environmental taxes 
 
The history of environmental taxation can be regarded from two different angles. One is the 
perspective of the history of economic thought, while the other is the history of the taxes and 
tax systems that have actually been used.  
 
The first to set out the basic idea of environmental taxation was A. C. Pigou who first 
introduced it in his 1920 book The Economics of Welfare with further discussion in his later A 
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Study in Public Finance (1928).1 He did not use the concept of environmental taxation, 
although he discussed a number of examples that we would now classify as environmental 
problems. Instead, he set his discussion in the more general analytical framework of 
deviations between private and social net product, as he called it; this corresponds roughly to 
the concepts of private and social marginal costs that were used above.2 His analysis covered 
not only negative but also positive externalities that called for subsidies (“bounties”) to the 
commodities or activities that generated them. He sketched a situation where he appeared to 
have in mind a tax system whose only task was to introduce corrections to situations where 
private incentives needed to be supplemented by interventions to overcome these deviations: 
 
“... it is always possible, on the assumption that no administrative costs are involved, 
to correct them [the deviations] by imposing appropriate rates of tax on resources 
employed in uses that tend to be pushed too far and employing the proceeds to provide 
bounties, at appropriate rates, on uses of the opposite class. There will necessarily 
exist a certain determinate scheme of taxes and bounties, which, in given conditions, 
distributional considerations being ignored, would lead to the optimum result.” (Pigou 
1928; 1947, p. 99.) 
 
Today, public finance and environmental economists recognize this idea as a fundamental and 
important one. But in the first few decades following Pigou’s analysis, it received relatively 
little attention in the academic literature. A prominent example of this neglect of the idea is 
Musgrave’s famous treatise on public finance (Musgrave 1959) which devotes little more than 
a paragraph to Pigouvian taxation and this in a chapter entitled “The ability-to-pay approach”. 
The environmental perspective is not mentioned in this paragraph and indeed is absent from 
the book as a whole. 
 
The interest in Pigouvian taxation as a tool of environmental policy started to take off around 
1970. Since then the idea has been explored in depth by a number of researchers. Among the 
most significant extensions of Pigou’s analysis have been the generalization of the theory 
from a partial to a general equilibrium framework, the attention to issues of second best where 
environmental taxes must be introduced in a distorted market system, and the broadening of 
                                                 
1 Externalities had also been discussed by Pigou’s teacher, Alfred Marshall, but his interest was mainly 
motivated by his desire to explain how the industry supply curve could be downward-sloping under competitive 
conditions.  
2 The distinction between on the one hand deviations between private and social marginal costs and on the other 
hand between private and social marginal benefits is often arbitrary and of little real significance. One of the 
costs that car congestion imposes on society is an increase in the time use required to commute, but whether this 
should be classified as an extra cost or as a reduction in the benefits of driving is mostly a matter of analytical 
convenience. 
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the perspective from local and national environmental issues to those that arise in the global 
environment. 
 
To what extent has environmental taxation actually been used? There is no doubt that these 
taxes are on the policy agenda to a larger extent than ever before, but summary measures of 
their importance are hard to obtain. How is importance to be measured? One suggestion has 
been to use the share of green taxes in government revenue or GDP. Data from the OECD for 
the period 1994-2006 show that the share of “environmentally related taxes”3 in GDP varied 
from 4.5-5 per cent (Denmark) to less than 1 per cent (United States); the weighted average 
for all OECD countries was a little less than 2 per cent, while the unweighted average for all 
30 countries included in the survey was about 2.5 per cent. In most of the countries the share 
was fairly stable over this period, although it dropped slightly in 2006. In terms of the share of 
environmental taxes in total tax revenue, the weighted average was a little less than 6 per cent, 
while the unweighted average was about 7 per cent. It is worth noting that these figures 
exclude fees and charges (e.g. for road use and parking).4  
 
These figures should naturally be interpreted with some care. There is an inevitable element 
of judgement involved in selecting the taxes that are environmentally related. Also, the period 
considered is too short to allow us to draw conclusions about long-term trends. Nevertheless, 
we may conclude that we are concerned with taxes that are of substantial importance for 
government revenue and the economy as a whole, although they have fallen considerably 
short of satisfying the revenue needs of modern governments. 
 
3. Financial vs. environmental impact 
 
To calculate the financial importance of environmental taxes is clearly an interesting exercise. 
However, if we are concerned with the effects of taxes on the quality of the environment this 
cannot be the main focus of our interest. Instead, this should be the effects that these taxes 
might have on the activities or commodities whose consumption and production we wish to 
reduce. The crucial concepts to use in this connection are the elasticities of demand and 
                                                 
3 These are defined as unrequited payments to governments on tax bases that are deemed to be of particular 
environmental relevance. Tax bases of this kind are mainly to be found in the fields of energy, transportation, 
emissions to air and water, waste management and noise. 
4 For a more detailed presentation of the OECD data and an outline of recent environmental tax policy in various 
countries see Barde and Braathen (2005).  
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supply. I focus here on demand elasticities, taking the view that the composition of output is 
essentially driven by consumer demand.  
 
It is easy to see that in terms of environmental impact, the share of a particular tax in 
government revenue or GDP is a poor measure of its environmental effect. In the case of a 
commodity with a very high elasticity of demand, a substantial effect on the environment may 
be achieved at a very low rate of tax, while conversely when the elasticity of demand is low 
the effect on the environment may be very small although the tax could generate substantial 
revenue. In that case, Pigouvian tax enthusiasts will have to face the common criticism that 
this is just another way for the government to satisfy its demand for increased tax revenue.  
 
In general, economists ought perhaps to be more explicit about the time frame that they have 
in mind when analyzing green tax effects on behaviour. The introduction of taxes on cars and 
car use may be a case in point5. In the short run, the effects of taxes on cars and petrol may be 
small, given the existing stock of cars and the supply of collective transport alternatives. But 
in a longer perspective this may change as a result of the long run tax incentives. Households 
may decide not to replace their second car or modify their habits as regards travelling to work. 
In the even longer run, increased taxes on private transport may reverse the trend in city 
development that has been so characteristic of the post-war period. Instead of the continuation 
of urban sprawl, we may come to see a movement towards more compact cities and greater 
reliance on less energy intensive and collective means of transportation. The Marshallian 
insight that elasticities are higher in the long run than the short is of crucial importance for 
environmental policy. 
 
The magnitude of the price elasticities are also likely to depend on other elements of public 
policy. According to Leape (2006), the success of the London congestion charge in reducing 
traffic in the central areas of the city was to a large extent due to the presence of a substitute 
for car use in the form of a well-developed system of public transport. The availability of this 
substitute was probably also the main reason why the congestion charge could be introduced 
with only minor effects on local business. Thus, the design of environmental tax policy should 
be seen in conjunction with that of publicly provided goods and services.  
 
                                                 
5 The various externalities connected with car ownership and use have been discussed by Parry, Walls and 
Harrington (2007). 
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 4. The identification of environmental taxes 
 
How do we decide which taxes are green taxes? It is natural, as in the OECD procedure, to 
define green taxes as those which are levied on tax bases that are correlated with adverse 
environmental effects. But this correlation may take many forms, and the classification of 
taxes may to a large extent depend on the judgement of those who carry it out. 
 
As an example of the difficulties that arise we may once more take taxes related to car use. In 
many countries, including my own, there are three classes of such taxes or charges. The first 
is related to car ownership: In Norway you pay an annual tax on cars and lorries (in addition 
to what you may pay on their asset value through the wealth tax) that is related to size, 
although there is no differentiation between different types of passenger cars6. The second 
type is the tax on petrol which is clearly directly related to car use. The third class consists of 
charges related to road use and includes tolls and parking fees. 
 
All three types have their obvious weaknesses as instruments of environmental policy. In the 
short run, the annual car tax does not discourage car use since it does not vary with the use of 
the car. However, in the long run it may affect the number of cars owned by families and 
thereby the intensity of car use. The petrol tax payments do vary with car use and the petrol 
tax can therefore with greater justification be called an environmental tax. But the petrol tax 
still suffers from some weaknesses in terms of environmental policy; it does not discriminate 
between various uses of the car according to location and time of day which may have very 
different environmental effects. Tolls and road user charges clearly have the potential to 
function as Pigouvian taxes in that the use of congested roads could be taxed at higher rates 
than other uses7. Parking fees can also be designed so as to vary with time and location and 
thereby improve environmental quality in congested cities.    
 
The tax rate should reflect the difference between social and private marginal cost, but how 
do we know whether a particular tax rate satisfies this requirement or whether it is too high or 
too low? This is a difficult question to answer and will have to be decided on empirical 
                                                 
6 The exception to this rule is el-cars that receive preferential treatment in being allowed to drive in the bus lanes 
and park at meters without charge. 
7 A sophisticated scheme for road pricing along these lines was proposed by Vickrey (1963). For a recent 
discussion of road user and congestion charges see Newbery (2005). 
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grounds in each particular case, but it also raises complex and interesting issues of a 
theoretical nature8.   
 
 5. The activities perspective and the tax base 
 
Environmental pollution may be generated both on the production and consumption sides of 
the economy. To simplify the theoretical treatment, the focus in the following will be on 
environmental externalities generated by consumers - in their capacities as drivers, energy 
users etc. It is by focusing on consumers that we most easily see some of the most crucial 
problems of environmental policy, such as the measurement of costs and benefits, issues of 
optimal taxation and distributional considerations.  
 
In much of the theoretical literature, the assumption is made that environmental effects 
depend on the aggregate consumption of particular commodities, and that there is a one-to-
one correspondence between externalities and goods. Although this assumption is often 
sufficient to analyze the central theoretical issues it also gives a highly simplified picture of 
the difficulties of policy design. As was illustrated by the example of the taxation of cars, 
environmental effects are basically generated by activities which may depend on the 
consumption of goods in rather complicated ways. An activity like driving during the rush 
hour uses the car, gasoline and time as important inputs, while the activity of central heating 
may depend on inputs like house insulation and electricity. Obviously, consumer goods like 
electricity, gasoline and time are used in additional activities that may have no or very much 
smaller environmental effects. The general perspective is that the total quantity that the 
consumer buys of any particular commodity is allocated between a number of different 
activities, some of which have negative effects on the quality of the environment and some 
have not. 
 
Suppose now that one particular activity generates environmental externalities and that we 
wish to internalize these effects by means of Pigouvian taxation. The first question that arises 
is what the tax base should be. Obviously, if it is the activity that generates the pollution, the 
tax should ideally be levied at the amount of the activity undertaken by consumers. This is an 
                                                 
8 The question has been discussed in Bruvoll (2009) who compares the OECD assessment of the revenues from 
environmental taxes in Norway with an estimate based on a more narrow definition used by a government 
commission on excise taxes. The latter shows the revenue from environmental taxes in Norway in 2007 to be 
less than 20 per cent of the OECD estimate.  
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application of the general principle of policy targeting. But in practice this advice may be 
difficult to follow: The level at which the activity is carried out may be difficult to measure, 
because the activity itself is not a subject of market transactions. A more feasible alternative is 
to tax goods, but the taxation of goods encounters difficulties when it comes to the 
discrimination between the uses of the goods in different activities. We may ideally wish to 
tax the use of a particular commodity in a particular activity, but administrative feasibility 
may limit us to the taxation of the total quantity bought by the consumer, whereby we tax the 
use of the commodity in all activities, whether they have adverse environmental effects or not. 
The car example affords a good illustration of the problems involved. For environmental 
reasons we might wish to tax the activity of driving in particular areas and at particular times. 
But if this is not feasible, the petrol tax might seem like a more practical alternative. However, 
for administrative reasons petrol has to be taxed at the same rate, whatever the activity is for 
which it is being used. The Pigouvian taxation of commodity i in activity j therefore has to be 
linked with the distortionary taxation of commodity i as it is used in environmentally neutral 
activities.   
 
This formulation provides a stylized explanation of why the ideal base for Pigouvian taxation 
may be difficult to achieve. Since there are high informational and administrate costs involved 
in taxing polluting activities, one has in practice to tax goods rather than activities. But 
because of the additional difficulty of linking environmental damage to the use of one 
particular commodity in the context of the harmful activity, the ideal of perfect targeting may 
be hard to achieve. With broad-based commodity taxes - in the sense of taxes that are levied 
at the same rate on all uses of the commodity - environmental taxes are likely to introduce 
distortions jointly with the corrections of imperfections in the market mechanism. This leads 
to the conclusion that several commodity taxes - or even several commodity taxes 
supplemented by quantitative regulations - may have to be used in order to achieve an optimal 
result.9 
 
It might perhaps be tempting to draw pessimistic policy conclusions from this analysis: If 
corrective Pigouvian taxes are likely to introduce new distortions, is it not to be expected that 
the net welfare gain from their use might easily become negative? In my view, this pessimism 
is unfounded. It is important to distinguish between achieving on the one hand a social 
                                                 
9 This issue was discussed in the context of optimal taxation theory in Sandmo (1976). 
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optimum and on the other hand a welfare improvement. Imperfect taxes, if used with good 
judgement and empirical knowledge, can clearly result in substantial welfare improvement in 
spite of falling short of the first best welfare ideal.       
 
 6. Principles of optimal taxation 
 
Needless to say, taxes are not only imposed for the purpose of improving the environment; 
their primary purpose is to raise revenue for publicly provided goods. Now since 
environmental taxes are not the only taxes used by the government to raise revenue, the 
question arises of how Pigouvian taxes should be determined given the existence of these 
other taxes. The simplest case is that where the government’s other source of revenue is lump 
sum taxes: Taxes that are levied on individuals as a fixed sum with a marginal tax rate of zero. 
In that case the Pigouvian taxes on commodities that generate adverse environmental effects 
should simply be equal to the difference between social and private marginal costs - the 
marginal social damage - all other commodity taxes being set equal to zero. This is often 
referred to as the first best case of environmental taxation. 
 
Unfortunately, for all practical purposes, ideal lump sum taxes do not exist outside of 
economic textbooks. To move the theory closer to the concerns of the problems faced by 
policy makers we have to consider environmental taxes in the context of a more realistic 
environment in which the government uses both ordinary - i.e. non-environmental - 
commodity taxes as well as direct taxes on income and wealth. These taxes introduce 
distortions in the economy by violating the conditions for an optimal allocation of resources 
or Pareto optimality.  
 
In the standard theory of optimal taxation, which goes back to the work of the English 
economist and mathematician Frank Ramsey (1927), the problem of externalities is neglected, 
and the focus is on the issue of how to raise a given amount of revenue from commodity taxes 
with a minimum loss of efficiency for the economy as a whole. Ramsey showed that under 
some simplifying assumptions tax rates should be inversely proportional to the elasticities of 
demand: Commodities with inelastic demand should be taxed at high rates, while those whose 
demand is more elastic should be taxed at lower rates. This is in contrast to the idea, which 
used to be prevalent in the public finance literature, that the least distortionary system of 
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commodity taxation would be one where taxes were uniform, i.e. levied at the same 
percentage rate on all goods. The Ramsey elasticity rule indicates that what we should worry 
about is not the distortions of relative prices but of relative quantities, and this is precisely 
what is achieved by the inverse elasticity rule10. Similarly, the marginal rate of income tax, to 
the extent that it applies mainly to income from labour, should be higher, the lower is the 
elasticity of labour supply.    
 
How are environmental taxes to be fitted into this framework of optimal taxation? For 
simplicity of exposition, let us assume that there is one commodity, the consumption or 
production of which creates a negative environmental externality (in the jargon of 
environmental economists this is often referred to as a “dirty good”). The remaining 
commodities have no such effects (they are “clean goods”). Then it can be shown (Sandmo 
1975, 2000) that for all clean goods the optimal tax rates satisfy the Ramsey rule: The rates 
should be inversely proportional by a factor a to the elasticities of demand. In the case of the 
dirty good, the tax rate should be a weighted average of that computed under the Ramsey 
inverse elasticity rule and the Pigouvian marginal social damage term, the weights being a 
and (1-a). The magnitude of a should reflect the tightness of the government’s budget 
constraint or the marginal cost of public funds. If this is very high, the parameter a becomes a 
number close to one, and the tax structure becomes similar to that which maximizes the 
revenue to the government. In this case the whole tax structure becomes very similar to that of 
Ramsey. If, on the other hand, a is very small the structure of the optimal tax system moves 
closer to that of the first best Pigouvian structure: Taxes on clean goods are approximately 
zero, while the taxes on dirty goods reflect their respective marginal social damage, just as in 
the first best case.  
 
One simplifying assumption that underlies this analysis should be emphasized: The version of 
the Ramsey rule that has been used here makes optimal tax rates proportional to the own 
elasticities of demand, while cross elasticities are disregarded. However, the Ramsey rule can 
be extended to the case of cross elasticities that differ from zero, and it can be shown that a 
similar rule, as well as the weighted average formula for dirty goods, holds for the more 
general case also.11 
                                                 
10 Indeed, one interpretation of the inverse elasticity rule is that the percentage reduction of private consumption 
should be the same for all goods.  
11 For more details, the reader is referred to the mathematical appendix to this article. 
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A short semi-mathematical digression may illuminate this. Let us denote by θR the ad valorem 
tax rate that maximizes government revenue (i.e. the inverse elasticity) and by θD  the rate that 
reflects the marginal social damage. Then, if θ is the overall tax rate, the optimal tax structure 
can be shown to satisfy the conditions 
 
θ = aθR    for all clean goods, 
 
and 
 
θ = aθR + (1-a)θD   for all dirty goods. 
 
A remarkable feature of this solution is that the tax rates on none of the clean goods should 
contain a component reflecting the marginal social damage, whether the clean goods are 
substitutes or complements in regard to the dirty good. This is an example of the principle of 
targeting: The policy instrument should be targeted as precisely as possible on the goal that it 
aims to influence. 
 
There are a number of special cases and extensions of this line of reasoning. Suppose that one 
of the clean goods is interpreted as leisure; the optimal tax rate could in this case be 
interpreted as the marginal rate of income tax under a linear tax system. Assume now that the 
demand for leisure - or, equivalently, the supply of labour - is completely inelastic. In this 
case an arbitrary large amount of revenue can be raised by the income tax without adverse 
distortionary effects. The income tax therefore becomes the equivalent of a lump sum tax, and 
the optimal solution is to raise the required revenue through the income tax while letting 
commodity taxes serve the sole purpose of correcting the market failure that follows from the 
environmental externalities. Commodity taxes should be zero on clean commodities and 
positive on dirty commodities.    
 
A difficulty about this whole line of reasoning is that it disregards distributional effects. To 
see the shortcomings of this restriction, assume that the benefits of environmental 
improvement accrue mainly to the rich while the “dirty goods” are chiefly consumed by the 
poor. In this example the effects of a green tax reform would be regressive, redistributing real 
income from the poor to the rich. With even a mildly egalitarian social welfare function such 
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an outcome would be unattractive and would need to be modified in the direction of more 
social justice. This could be done along several lines. One solution is to modify the tax 
formulas above: In the calculation of the aggregate marginal social damage, the damage 
suffered by the rich could receive a lower weight than the damage experienced by the poor. 
Moreover, in calculating the Ramsey efficiency terms of the marginal tax formulas, the 
inverse elasticity terms could be weighted according to the distributive profile of the 
consumption patterns of the various goods. By so doing, there would be a bias towards taxing 
necessities (which tend to have low price elasticities of demand) at lower rates than luxury 
goods (whose elasticities are higher). The overall tax structure would therefore emerge as a 
compromise between the regard for social efficiency and distributive justice.  
 
Another response to the possible conflict between the concerns for efficiency and distributive 
justice is to develop policy instruments that are better targeted on the redistributive goal. We 
have already noted the administrative impossibility of a system of individualized lump sum 
taxes, but there are clearly interesting cases in between this extreme case and the other 
extreme where all taxes are proportional. One possibility that has been extensively discussed 
in the literature is that of a general non-linear income tax, an idea that receives its inspiration 
from the work of Mirrlees (1971). In the theoretical formulation of Mirrlees the marginal rate 
of income tax is allowed to vary continuously with income, and it has been shown that the 
optimal marginal tax rate at the top of the income scale should in fact be zero. In an aggregate 
perspective, this is just the outcome that we would have under lump sum taxation, and under 
some particular assumptions it has been demonstrated that with a general non-linear income 
tax the redistributive concern should in its entirety be taken care of by the income tax, while 
Pigouvian environmental taxes should be calculated according to the first best rule; see 
Kaplow (2008).  
 
The discussion above has proceeded on the assumption that environmental damage is 
generated by the consumption and production of particular commodities that are feasible 
objects of taxation. This is not always a realistic assumption. As pointed out in Section 5 
above, environmental externalities are frequently generated by activities, not goods. But the 
taxation of activities may be difficult since activities as such are not traded in the market and 
therefore are awkward bases for taxation. To achieve an effective taxation of activities one 
has to have a broad-based system in which taxes are levied on several commodities that go 
into the production of the activity in question. This, of course, is a type of policy with which 
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we have practical experience: Car use is taxed by a number of different tax types, and the 
same is true for other kinds of environmental problems. 
 
7. The double dividend issue 
 
One issue that has received a lot of attention in policy debates and also in the academic 
literature is that of the so-called double dividend. We have already touched upon the main 
point: Green taxes improve the environment, but they also raise revenue. Consider a tax 
reform where environmental taxes are increased while other taxes, like income taxes and the 
VAT, are reduced in an amount that keeps total tax revenue constant. Since these other taxes 
impose efficiency losses on the economy, this reform succeeds in substituting efficiency-
enhancing for efficiency-reducing taxes. So the result is apparently that we are able to raise 
the same amount of tax revenue with less dead-weight loss at the same time as we improve 
the quality of the environment. This implies that we get two benefits or dividends from a 
green tax reform: (1) the state of the environment is improved and (2) we adopt a tax system 
with less distortion of commodity and factor markets. The argument is an attractive one with a 
strong appeal to economic intuition. But a closer analysis shows that we need to think 
carefully about it before making serious recommendations about tax reform.12 
 
One problem with this idea is that it fails to be precise about the assumption that is made 
about the state of the tax system at the time of the reform. To see the importance of this, let us 
assume that the tax system has been optimized according to the principles laid out in the 
previous section. Then, by the nature of an optimum, a small shift in the tax system towards 
more green taxation will have no effect on social welfare; the change in the environmental 
dividend is exactly cancelled by the associated change of the tax efficiency dividend. There is 
no double dividend at all. 
 
But the assumption that the tax system is optimal to begin with is an extreme one. The theory 
of optimal taxation was never designed to provide a realistic description of the actual tax 
system. An alternative approach is therefore to start from some description of the actual tax 
system that is closer to what the proponents of the double dividend idea have probably had in 
mind. One such assumption is that we start from a situation with no green taxes at all. The 
                                                 
12 An anthology of recent contributions and a survey of the double dividend debate is Goulder (2002).  
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reason for this state of affairs might be that individuals and politicians have been ignorant of 
the environmental problems that exist in the economy or have not been aware that taxation 
could provide the solution to the problems. Then environmental taxes are introduced as a new 
element of the overall tax system with a reduction of the level of distortionary taxation in 
commodity and factor markets. Can we be sure, abstracting from distributional effects, that 
there is a gain in economic welfare?  
 
The answer, in general, is no, and it is not difficult to see why. The demand both for clean and 
dirty goods depends on the whole set of tax-inclusive prices in the economy. Thus, a 
reduction in the consumer price of a particular clean good could increase the demand for a 
dirty good, thereby counteracting the initial effect of an increase in green taxes, making the 
environmental dividend doubtful. On the other hand, a price increase for dirty goods could by 
a similar argument affect the structure of demand for clean goods in such a way as to make 
the effects of price distortions worse than they were before. 
 
Our conclusion regarding the existence of a double dividend from a green tax reform must 
therefore be a cautious one: There could be such an effect, but it is not assured. Whether it 
will occur or not depends both on the initial state of the tax system and on the structure of 
demand, especially as regards the cross price effects between markets for clean and dirty 
goods. Empirical studies are required in order to determine the outcome in any particular 
reform situation. 
 
A special version of the double dividend hypothesis concerns its effects on unemployment. It 
has been argued by several economists and policy makers that a tax reform which increases 
the level of green taxes and combines this with a cut in the payroll tax would lead both to an 
environmental gain and to a higher level of employment. The underlying idea is that in a 
situation of some kind of Keynesian unemployment equilibrium actual employment is 
determined by the demand for labour in private firms, and by lowering the payroll tax one 
decreases the price of labour to employers, thereby generating an increase of labour demand 
and employment.13 
 
                                                 
13 Among the contributions to the analysis of this issue are Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996) and Koskela, 
Schöb and Sinn (1998). 
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It should be noted that in order to evaluate this claim we need to use a model that is different 
from that of perfect competition. If the wage rate does not adjust so as to equalize demand and 
supply for labour we need an alternative theory of wage formation. One possibility is to use a 
model of trade union behaviour in which the union sets the wage rate while firms, taking this 
wage rate as given, determine the amount of employment - the so-called monopoly union 
model14. In this case, the union will set the wage above the level that leads to elimination of 
unemployment. Although the union aims to maximize the welfare of its members, it has to 
weigh the welfare effects of higher wages for the employed against the welfare of the 
unemployed, and this will result in a wage rate that is above the market-clearing level. Cutting 
the payroll tax, it could be argued, leads to a reduction of the wage rate and therefore to less 
unemployment. 
 
Like the previous argument in favour of the double dividend, this also needs careful 
evaluation. A notable weakness of it is that it completely disregards the problem of tax 
incidence. If firms are confronted with lower gross wages (wages plus payroll tax) so that 
they earn higher profits, it is reasonable to believe that unions will claim some of these gains 
for themselves by increasing their wage demands; if so, this would lead to a smaller gain for 
society in terms of unemployment reduction. A further complication is that the increase of 
green taxes on goods like energy and transportation will reduce the real wage of the workers, 
giving them cause to argue for compensatory nominal wage increases. Taking account of both 
elements of tax incidence, one has to face the possibility that the net effect of a green tax 
reform on wages and unemployment may in fact be quite small. 
 
Although our discussion of the double dividend has to end on an agnostic note, this is not to 
say that a green tax reform may not be able to produce both a better environment and a more 
efficient tax system. But whether it will actually succeed in this is a question that cannot be 
settled on theoretical grounds alone; each tax reform proposal has to be evaluated on the basis 
of the empirical context in which it is proposed. 
 
  8. Taxes, regulations and the costs of administration 
 
                                                 
14 An excellent survey of such models, although now somewhat dated in its coverage of the literature, is Oswald 
(1985). 
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Pigouvian taxes are clearly not the only instruments whereby governments can attempt to 
internalize environmental externalities. An alternative to taxes in many cases is to use 
transferable quotas. This instrument, however, has so many points of similarity with taxes that 
it will not be discussed further here.15 But in practice governments use a number of other 
instruments, and although economists have traditionally had a strong preference for the 
market based instruments of taxes and transferable quotas, the use of command-and-control 
instruments exemplified by non-transferable quotas and direct regulation of production 
technology or product quality is in fact widespread.  
 
The standard criticism of command-and-control instruments is first that they are likely to have 
higher administrative costs and second that they fail to achieve a given reduction of pollution 
at minimum cost to society. One may naturally ask, therefore, whether the use of command-
and-control instruments is simply a case of misguided policy or whether it can be justified by 
more careful theoretical analysis. A crucial point regarding the efficiency properties of 
Pigouvian taxes is that the government is capable of choosing the right tax base. But, as 
pointed out in Section 5 above this is not always a reasonable assumption. Quite often it is the 
consumption or production of a particular good in a particular social situation or activity that 
generates the externality, whereas taxes typically have to be general taxes that are paid on 
every unit of the good that is produced or consumed. 
 
A case in point is the consumption of cigarettes. The taxation of smoking is often justified by 
the argument that “smoking is bad for you”, which is one that goes beyond the externalities 
framework. Although paternalistic arguments deserve more serious consideration than they 
often receive, the focus here will be on the externalities of cigarette smoking which have also 
been used as arguments for high excise taxes on cigarettes. But in many social contexts or 
situations it can be argued that there are hardly any externalities from smoking, or at least that 
the externalities generated in some contexts are much less than in other social settings. This 
would call for differentiated taxation of cigarettes depending on the social context or activity 
in which they are used; as pointed out in section 5, one would ideally like to tax activities 
rather than commodities. But this is not a feasible strategy of taxation, since it would involve 
prohibitive administrative costs. A simpler alternative would be to impose a ban on cigarette 
                                                 
15 The equivalence of taxes and quotas pertains especially to their efficiency properties. Their distributional 
consequences might, however, be quite different, dependent on the manner in which the government chooses to 
distribute quotas to polluters. 
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smoking in particular places like lecture halls, football stadiums and restaurants, where the 
negative externalities from passive smoking are particularly serious. A combination of taxes 
and regulations might therefore in many cases be a more efficient policy - both in the sense of 
minimizing distortions and having lower costs of administration - than that of exclusive 
reliance on taxes. This raises interesting questions of the choice of an optimum combination 
of taxes and regulations, and a number of these have been analyzed in a recent paper by 
Christiansen and Smith (2009). One of their conclusions is that if a Pigouvian commodity tax 
is supplemented by regulation it is the use of the commodity that causes the larger externality 
that should be regulated.   
 
While the cost of differentiation is an important element of the overall costs of administration 
of the tax system, another element is the control of tax evasion. Tax evasion has received 
most attention by economists in the context of income tax compliance, but there is also 
considerable evidence of the importance of indirect tax evasion. An interesting question is 
now whether the efficiency properties of Pigouvian taxes carry over to the case where there is 
tax evasion. This problem has been analyzed in Sandmo (2002), where it is shown that to a 
large extent they do, since the theoretical analysis shows that decisions about output and 
emissions are often separable from the decision to evade taxes; the efficiency properties of 
taxes therefore remain the same as in the standard analysis. Using the same theoretical 
framework for the analysis of quota violations it can be shown that the combination of the 
fine or penalty rate and the probability of detection may be designed so that the expected fine 
has many of the efficiency properties of Pigouvian taxes.  The gap between taxes and quotas 
on the one hand and regulations on the other may therefore not be as wide as often alleged in 
the literature.   
 
 9. Do taxes crowd out intrinsic incentives? 
 
Most of the literature on the public good type of externalities - prophetically referred to as 
“the creation of atmosphere” by Meade (1952) - assumes that the individual consumer and 
firm do not care about the amount of their own emissions of pollution. The agent may care 
about the public good that is negatively affected by his activities, such as clean air and the 
absence of noise, but in his behaviour he does not take into account his own (negative) 
contribution to the public good. The reason is simply than in a setting where many agents 
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contribute to the quality of the public good, incentives are such that it is rational for the agent 
to neglect the link between his own decisions about consumption and production and the 
public good, although he may well realize that in the aggregate such a link does in fact exist. 
The purpose of environmental taxation is to create private incentives to act in a socially 
rational way by creating private incentives that would otherwise be non-existent. 
 
However, the realism of this assumption is questionable. If it were literally true, we would 
certainly see much more littering of public places than we actually do, and there would be 
fewer cases of people who buy environmental-friendly products when cheaper alternatives are 
available. In order to capture this aspect of behaviour we need to extend our model of 
individual motivation. We must assume that the individual agent not only cares about his 
private interest in the sense of his utility of consumption or his profit, but that his own 
individual emissions contribute negatively to his utility or perceived profit. 
 
In order to fix ideas it may be useful to consider the simple case of a competitive firm that 
emits a harmful substance as a by-product of its activities. The firm maximizes revenue minus 
costs, where the cost function varies positively with output and negatively with emissions 
(this implies that costs increase when emissions are reduced). Another deduction from 
revenue is a tax per unit of emissions. Under standard profit maximizing assumptions, the 
firm will set its marginal cost of production equal to the market price and the marginal cost of 
pollution reduction equal to the tax rate on pollution (the Pigouvian tax). 
 
Suppose now that there is an additional element of cost that reflects the firm’s negative 
evaluation of its pollution activities.16 This subjective element of cost is increasing in the 
amount of pollution, and it is natural to assume that the marginal cost is also increasing. The 
conditions for profit maximization are now, first, that the marginal cost of production equals 
the market price as before, and that the marginal cost of pollution reduction is equal to the 
sum of the Pigouvian tax and the “conscience tax”. The latter concept is simply the additional 
element of cost that is incurred with a small increase in the amount of pollution. 
 
                                                 
16 It may be objected that this assumption is inconsistent with the assumption of competitive markets with free 
entry: If the firm imposes such a cost on itself it will be squeezed out of the market by new entrants that do not 
“suffer” from concerns about the environment. On the other hand, it is open to debate whether a realistic model 
of competitive markets really requires this knife-edge view of the consequences of deviations from pure profit 
maximization. Anyway, the case that is discussed here should be taken as a simple example of a more general 
approach that needs more justification than can be provided in the present context.   
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An interesting question is what happens to the conscience tax with an increase in the 
Pigouvian tax rate. This implies that “extrinsic incentives” are introduced in a situation where 
“intrinsic incentives” already exist and an important question is now whether a strengthening 
of the former will lead to a weakening of the latter.17 It has been claimed by several authors, 
e.g. by Weck-Hannemann and Frey (1995) and Frey (1997), that an increased use of extrinsic 
or financial incentives will so weaken intrinsic or moral incentives that the net effects of 
policy instruments like Pigouvian taxation may be doubtful. In the model outlined above this 
hypothesis is supported in the sense that an increase in the rate of Pigouvian tax leads to a 
reduction in the conscience tax, but by less than the increase in the formal tax rate. In other 
words, the conscience tax is partially but not completely crowded out by the Pigouvian tax. 
This tax still has the power to curb pollution but by less than one would be led to think on the 
basis of the pure theory of profit maximization. 
 
How destructive are these considerations in relation to the economic case for green taxes? In 
the model of the example, an increase of the Pigouvian tax rate still leads to reduced 
emissions and is therefore an important policy instrument if policy makers consider that 
intrinsic incentives are too weak to reach the socially optimal reduction of emissions. 
Moreover, on the natural assumption that the conscience tax varies among individual agents, 
the Pigouvian tax helps to make the total tax on pollution - i.e. the formal tax rate plus the 
conscience tax - more uniform among polluters. This would be a step towards equalizing the 
marginal cost of pollution cutbacks across economic agents and therefore towards production 
efficiency in environmental policy.  
 
There is more to be said about this issue, however. It is clearly possible to argue that the 
preservation of intrinsic incentives in itself is good for the well-being of society. An incentive 
scheme that drives out moral attitudes may in this view create a society of individuals and 
firms that feel less responsible towards the environment, and the social cost of such a 
development of moral attitudes may be serious. On the other hand, one could also argue that 
the adoption of a system of extrinsic incentives for environmental improvement could 
increase people’s awareness of these problems and thus contribute to more environmental 
friendly attitudes.   
 
                                                 
17 A general analysis of the various issues that arise in the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives is 
Bénabou and Tirole (2006). 
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 10. International aspects of environmental taxation 
 
Some of the most significant environmental problems of our time are of a global nature.18 In 
particular, the issue of global warming has caused great concern among natural scientists and 
politicians as well as among economists as witnessed by the debate following the publication 
of the Stern review (Stern 2006). The perspective taken by Stern is that of environmental 
policy as a form of social insurance: We may not know with perfect certainty the extent and 
effects of global warming, but the risks involved are certainly large enough to justify spending 
about one per cent of global GDP annually to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
The policy alternatives that are available to achieve the goal of a substantial decrease in global 
emissions include both taxes, quotas and regulations, so that much of the analysis of 
international environmental policy, including the use of Pigouvian taxes, can benefit from the 
insights derived from the study of domestic policies. However, the international setting raises 
some new problems that require careful consideration. 
 
The state of the atmosphere is an example of a global public good. A global public good is 
characterized by being publicly available to all of the world’s population in equal amount. 
This does not imply that all the world’s inhabitants value the good in equal measure, but 
simply that we cannot improve the quality of the atmosphere for one group of people without 
at the same time improving it for everyone in the world.19 The optimal state of the atmosphere 
has been achieved when the marginal benefit of preventing global warming is equal to the 
cost of preventing it. One of the ways to achieve the reduction of emissions into the 
atmosphere is the use of Pigouvian taxes on a global scale. 
 
The problem that arises at this stage is that while the benefits of environmental policy are 
global, the costs may have to be borne locally. Confronted with the problem of the 
determination of global public goods supply, all individual countries of the world find 
themselves in the situation of the single individual in a conventional public goods setting: In 
                                                 
18 Although the emphasis here is on global warming, there are other important examples of global environmental 
problems, such as pollution of the oceans and the reduction of global biodiversity. 
19 This statement needs some modification in that groups of the world’s population might evaluate global 
warming positively because their own local environment might benefit from enjoying a more pleasant climate 
and higher agricultural productivity. For an analytical treatment of the theory of global public goods and 
externalities see Sandmo (2003, 2005). 
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the process of arriving at a global solution, each country has an incentive to misrepresent its 
preferences and costs and to free ride on the benefits provided by the policies of other 
countries. However, if all countries reason in the same way, the result will be a serious 
underinvestment in the prevention of global warming, taking the form e.g. of suboptimal use 
of green taxes from the point of view of global economic welfare. 
 
One of the advantages of Pigouvian taxes in a domestic setting is that they tend to produce a 
reduction of pollution emissions that satisfies the demand for production efficiency. Because 
all polluters face the same tax rate, they will equate the marginal cost of pollution cutbacks to 
the tax rate. This marginal cost accordingly becomes equalized among producers and the 
aggregate reduction of emissions is minimized for society as a whole. Applying this line of 
reasoning to global externalities, one would like to ensure that the marginal cost of reducing 
pollution is the same for all polluters, and this can be achieved by imposing the same tax rate 
on emissions from all countries. This is the chief justification for the much discussed proposal 
of a global carbon tax, i.e. a tax on CO2 emissions. 
 
There are two issues that arise in connection with this proposal that are significantly different 
from the analysis of domestic taxes. One is the lack of an international authority that has the 
power to impose global taxes, i.e. taxes that all the world’s nations would be obliged to adopt. 
In the absence of such an authority, the adoption of a global carbon tax requires the voluntary 
consent of all countries affected by the measure. This is clearly a difficult agreement to bring 
about in view of the international free rider problem. But even if this problem could somehow 
be overcome there is an additional although related problem regarding the distributional 
impact of the tax in a world with enormous disparities in terms of per capita income and 
consumption. Is it fair that the poor areas of the world should pay the same rate of tax per unit 
of CO2  emissions as the rich industrialized countries? 
 
There are basically two ways out of this dilemma. One is to differentiate the tax between rich 
and poor countries, letting the developing countries pay at a lower rate than the industrialized 
countries. Obviously, the differentiation scheme would have to be designed with some care, 
e.g. so as to avoid major jumps in the tax rate as countries move into higher tax brackets with 
increasing GDP per capita.20 Whatever the degree of differentiation, this system would entail 
                                                 
20 Such jumps would have unfortunate effects especially with regard to tax compliance; they would give 
countries strong incentives to underreport their per capita GDP when it approaches the lower limit of a new tax 
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a loss of global production efficiency in that the marginal cost of pollution reduction would no 
longer be equalized among countries, but this could be regarded as a price to be paid for a 
more equitable distribution of world income. The other solution to the dilemma is to combine 
a uniform CO2 tax with an international scheme of redistribution whereby rich nations make 
transfers of income to the poor countries in return for their agreement to adopt a globally 
uniform emissions tax. In this scheme, the international uniformity of the tax would ensure 
global production efficiency without adverse consequences for the degree of international 
inequality.       
 
  11. The political economy of environmental policy 
 
Given the efficiency properties of green taxes one might expect them to be among the more 
attractive forms of taxation to be considered by governments and their electorates, but this is 
in fact far from being the case. Many politicians are difficult to convince about the social 
benefits of environmental taxation and among the general public proposals to introduce such 
taxes are frequently met with a good deal of scepticism if not outright hostility. There may be 
a number of reasons for this state of affairs, and the possible explanations may vary in 
importance from one country to another and also over time. Below I consider briefly some of 
these. 
 
An important motivation for many of those on the right of the political spectrum who resist 
the introduction of environmental taxes is undoubtedly that they have a negative attitude 
towards attempts at what they see as unwarranted expansion of the public sector. The thought 
experiment of economists who analyze tax reform under the assumption of constant tax 
revenue is not well understood; instead, the arguments are interpreted as just another set of 
proposals to increase tax revenue and thereby the size of the public sector.21  
 
Another explanation for sceptical attitudes towards green taxes is that the incentive arguments 
may in fact not be easy to understand. The arguments of economists regarding private 
incentives, the importance of elasticities, the efficiency costs of taxes etc. are much less 
                                                                                                                                                        
bracket. Reinforcing this problem is the considerable degree of uncertainty attached to the computation of the 
exact magnitude of GDP. Letting small differences in the principles of GDP estimation have significant effects 
for a country’s tax liability would clearly be undesirable. 
21 In fairness, it should also be pointed out that some of the adherents of environmental taxes on the left may put 
too much weight on these taxes as sources of revenue for a larger public sector. 
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evident to the general public than many economists tend to believe. Perhaps the emphasis in 
some of the policy literature on the double dividend from a green tax reform - especially in 
the form of its effects on unemployment - stem from the desire of some of its supporters to 
provide a sales argument that is of more concrete substance than the benefits to the natural 
and social environment. 
 
A related explanation is that green taxes may be regarded by many as “lifestyle taxes”. Higher 
taxes on petrol and other sources of energy will make it more expensive to drive private cars, 
live in the suburbs, have a second home in the countryside as well as carrying out a number of 
other energy-intensive leisure activities. To the extent that lifestyles are fixed in the short run, 
the argument that energy taxes may have long run benefits e.g. in the form of smaller houses 
that require less energy and less commuting may carry little weight with much of today’s 
electorate. Taxes that threaten the financial viability of a lifestyle that one has become 
accustomed to are hardly likely to be very popular among voters. 
 
For some aspects of environmental taxation there may also be considerable scepticism and 
ignorance regarding the real effects of environmental policy. This applies with special force to 
the crucial issue of global warming and may explain the popular appeal of the arguments 
advanced by those who claim that there is no global warming problem that requires painful 
measures like increased energy taxes. Obviously, it is also difficult to get popular support for 
policies that impose sacrifices on today’s consumers and producers for what is seen as the 
doubtful benefits to those who will live in a distant future.  
 
12. Further issues and concluding remarks 
 
This paper has covered a number of problems related to the theory and practice of 
environmental taxation. Nevertheless, there are clearly a number of issues that have been left 
out and would have deserved more careful attention, and some of these may require brief 
mention. 
 
First, as in almost the whole of the literature in this area, our discussion of environmental 
externalities has taken the competitive equilibrium as its point of departure. Firms and 
consumers take market prices as given; similarly, because of their individual inability to affect 
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market outcomes they also take tax rates as given. Analytically, there is much to be said for 
this procedure because it abstracts from the complexities involved in taking account of other 
imperfections of the market system. However, real economies are in fact characterized to a 
large extent by imperfect competition which raises two interesting issues for the analysis of 
environmental taxes. One is the design of optimal taxes in a setting where market prices, even 
in the absence of externalities, are not such as to lead to an efficient allocation. The other is 
that with only a few firms on the production side of the market, a tax that is levied on these is 
likely to be seen by the firms concerned as subject to negotiation with the tax authorities, and 
the competitive model with price and tax takers no longer applies. 
 
I have only briefly touched on the argument of production efficiency in environmental policy: 
When all agents face the same tax rate on their polluting activity the marginal cost of 
pollution cutbacks will be equalized between them. (This argument applies obviously to 
firms, but it can also easily be adapted to the case of consumers, especially if we adopt the 
activities perspective of Section 5 above.) In this way, environmental taxation achieves static 
production efficiency22. But there is a further argument that relates to dynamic efficiency. The 
static argument applies to a situation where the technology of production is given. However, 
higher environmental taxes also provide incentives to change the technology of production so 
as to lower costs, thereby encouraging firms to develop new and more environmental friendly 
production technologies.    
 
The foregoing discussion has set out the benefits of environmental taxation but it has also 
emphasized the difficulties that arise regarding their practical design. Although it is important 
to be aware of the complexities involved in a process of tax reform, it should also be pointed 
out that the adoption of green taxes that are less than perfect when measured in terms of 
idealized theoretical models may still involve substantial benefits for society. To revert once 
more to the car example: The fact that a tax on petrol is unable to differentiate between 
different types of car use should not be taken as a decisive argument against regarding the 
petrol tax as a green tax.  
 
Green taxation is an interesting example of the cases where economists can be regarded as the 
inventors of policy instruments. While both the income tax and ordinary indirect taxes have 
                                                 
22 This argument received early emphasis in the article by Baumol and Oates (1971). 
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been developed over a long period of time, having been refined and extended by generations 
of politicians and bureaucrats, environmental taxation is a relatively recent innovation in the 
tax system that owes its existence to a large extent to the creative efforts of academic 
researchers. Since the time of Pigou, a number of economists have been involved in 
establishing both better theoretical insights and more extensive empirical knowledge of the 
effects of these taxes. More efforts should also be spent in making the theory of green taxation 
better understood among the general public.  
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 Mathematical appendix 
 
This appendix sets out in more (although not complete) detail the steps leading to the 
conclusions about the optimal tax structure in an economy with environmental externalities 
that are discussed less formally in Section 6.  
 
Assume that the economy consists of n identical individual consumers. Each of them has a 
utility function that depends on the consumption of three private goods, numbered 0, 1, 2. In 
addition, utility depends on the amount of environmental pollution, e. Assuming that the 
utility function is weakly separable between consumption and the quality of the 
environment23, the utility of a representative consumer can be written as 
 
U = U(u(x0, x1, x2), e).       (1) 
 
The marginal utilities of the three consumption goods are positive24, while the derivate with 
respect to the environmental variable, e, is negative. As another simplification, and 
abstracting from the complexities discussed in Section 5, the amount of environmental 
pollution is assumed to be proportional to the aggregate consumption of commodity 2: 
 
 e = nx2.        (2) 
 
The budget constraint of the consumer is 
 
 x0 + P1x1 + P2x2  = y.       (3) 
 
Thus, commodity 0 is taken to be the numéraire, which is untaxed, while P1 and P2 are the 
consumer prices. Specific taxes are levied on the two taxable goods, so that 
 
 P1 = p1 + t1  and  P2 = p2 + t2.      (4) 
 
                                                 
23 The implications of this assumption will be discussed below. 
24 If one of the three commodities is interpreted as leisure, the model could also be redesigned to accommodate a 
linear income tax.  
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Producer prices, denoted by p1 and p2, are assumed to be given from the production side of the 
economy.  
 
We first consider the demand behaviour of the representative consumer. Maximizing the 
utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint (3) enables us to derive the individual 
demand functions as 
 
 x0 = x0(P1, P2, y),  x1 = x1(P1, P2, y),  x2 = x2(P1, P2, y).  (5) 
 
Substituting the demand functions into the utility function (1) we get the indirect utility 
function 
 
 V = V(v(P1, P2, y), e).       (6)     
 
At this point it is natural to remark on the assumption of weak separability that was 
introduced above. It is easy to see that because environmental pollution, e, does not enter into 
the sub-utility function u, nor into the budget constraint, the demand functions will be 
independent of the quality of the environment. If this assumption had not been made, we 
would have had to take account of the environmental feedback on demand: A price increase 
would have a direct effect on demand for each of the two goods, but since the price would 
also affect the quality of the environment via the consumption of commodity 2, there would 
be an additional effect which can be neglected in the present formulation.25 However, this 
simplification does not affect the substantive economic contents of the analysis. Note also that 
consumers take the state of the environment as exogenously given so that each consumer 
disregards the fact that his own consumption affects the state of the environment, which is a 
natural assumption in the context of a large economy. 
 
The government chooses optimal tax rates t1  and t2 with the objective of maximizing the 
utility of the representative individual. This objective is obviously equivalent, in the case of 
identical individuals, to the utilitarian sum of utilities.   
 
  W = U(u(x0, x1, x2), e) = V(v(P1, P2, y), e).    (7) 
                                                 
25 For a fuller discussion of the environmental feedback effect see Sandmo (2000, Ch. 5). 
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The budget constraint of the government requires that a given amount of per capita revenue, 
T, be raised through commodity taxation, so that 
 
 t1x1 + t2x2 = T.        (8) 
 
It is assumed that lump sum taxation, i.e. a tax levied directly on y, is not an available 
instrument of tax policy. The impossibility of lump sum taxation is motivated by more 
complex models with heterogeneous individuals and informational problems; here we use this 
insight in a simplified context which in itself admittedly does not explain the impossibility of 
first best optimal taxation. 
 
The government maximizes social welfare subject to its revenue constraint. Forming the 
Lagrangian function 
 
 Λ = V(v(P1, P2, y), e) + μ[t1x1 + t2x2 - T],    (9) 
 
we can take the derivatives with respect to t1 and t2 and use the first order conditions to 
characterize the optimal tax system. Instead of presenting the results in their most general 
form, given the limitations of the three commodity model, we focus on the special case where 
demand functions are independent, so that the cross price derivatives are zero (for more 
details of the mathematical derivation as well as an analysis of the more general case, see 
Sandmo (2000)). Defining the percentage tax rates as θ1 = t1/P1 and θ2 = t2/P2  we can write 
the optimal tax rates as 
 
 θ1 = a(-1/ε11)        (10) 
 
 θ2 = a(-1/ε22) +(1-a)(-nVe/λP2)     (11) 
 
Here we have defined a = (μ-λ)/μ as the percentage gap between the marginal utilities of 
income in the public and private sectors. In order to interpret the optimality conditions, it is 
useful to begin by disregarding the second term in equation (11). We see then that optimal tax 
rates are characterized as being proportional to the inverse of the price elasticities of demand; 
a result first derived by Ramsey (1927) and later restated and extended by Samuelson (1951; 
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1986), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and many others. Intuitively, taxes ought, for efficiency 
reasons to distort relative quantities as little as possible, and this is precisely what is achieved 
by taxing the more price elastic commodities at the highest rates.  
 
The second term in equation (11) expresses the marginal social damage. The damage at the 
individual level, expressed in unities of the polluting commodity, is Ve/λP2, and this must be 
multiplied by n to arrive at the social damage. 
 
Finally, in order to connect this analysis with the presentation in the main text of this paper, 
we may define 
 
 θ1R = (-1/ε11), θ2R = (-1/ε22) and θD = (-nVe/λP2). 
 
Substituting these expressions into (10) and (11), the equations can be rewritten as 
 
 θ1 = aθ1R.        (12) 
 
 θ2 = aθ2R + (1-a)θD.        (13) 
 
These equations correspond to the expressions in the text of Section 6 above. 
 
As also noted in Section 6, a notable feature of this solution is that the marginal social damage 
only enters into the tax formula for commodity 2, while the tax on commodity 1 is 
characterized by its Ramsey term only. This is an example of the principle of targeting. 
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